Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
研究了企业与多个工人之间的两种工资谈判博弈，发现早期谈判的工人获得更大收益，并提出一种新博弈（Rolodex博弈）使各方收益等于夏普利值。
We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains from trade captured by workers who bargain earlier with the firm are larger than those captured by workers who bargain later, as well as larger than those captured by the firm. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are different from those reported in Stole and Zwiebel as they are not the Shapley values. We propose a novel bargaining game, the Rolodex game, which follows a simple and realistic protocol. In the unique no-delay Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game, the payoffs to the firm and to the workers are their Shapley values.