Financing Entrepreneurial Production: Security Design with Flexible Information Acquisition
研究了创业融资中投资者可灵活获取信息时的最优证券设计，发现当企业家议价能力强时，债务在信息价值低时最优，债务与股权组合在信息价值高时最优；若投资者议价能力强或仅能在融资后获取信息，则股权最优。
We propose a theory of security design in financing entrepreneurial production, positing that the investor can acquire costly information on the entrepreneur’s project before making the financing decision. When the entrepreneur has enough bargaining power in security design, the optimal security helps incentivize both efficient information acquisition and efficient financing. Debt is optimal when information is not very valuable for production, whereas the combination of debt and equity is optimal when information is valuable. If, instead, the investor has sufficiently strong bargaining power in security design or can acquire information only after financing, equity is optimal.Received October 12, 2015; editorial decision February 10, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.