Layoffs and Lemons
构建并检验了一个信息不对称的裁员模型：当企业有裁员自主权时，市场会推断被裁员工能力低，导致其再就业工资更低、失业期更长，而工厂关闭导致的失业则无此负面信号。基于当前人口调查数据的实证结果支持模型的三个预测。
We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric-information model of layoffs. When firms have discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low ability. Assuming that no such negative inference is warranted if workers are displaced in a plant closing, postdisplacement wages should be lower and postdisplacement unemployment spells should be longer for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings, but predisplacement wages should not differ by cause of displacement. Evidence on displaced workers from Current Population Surveys supports all three of our model's predictions.