Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?
研究超速罚单不仅取决于车速，还受警察和地方政府激励的影响，发现警察更倾向给外地司机和难以申诉的司机开罚单，尤其在财政紧张时。
Speeding tickets are determined not only by the speed of the offender, but also by incentives faced by police officers and their vote-maximizing principals. We hypothesize that police officers issue fines more frequently when drivers have a higher opportunity cost of contesting a ticket, and when drivers are not residents of the local municipality. We also predict that local officers are more likely to issue a ticket to out-of-town drivers when fiscal conditions are tight and legal limits prevent increases in property taxes. Using data from traffic stops in Massachusetts, we find support for our hypotheses.