Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment
通过电话呼叫中心实地实验，检验员工是否如“理性欺骗者”模型所预测，在监督强度变化时调整机会主义行为，发现部分员工符合模型，但多数员工不受监督率影响，且异质性与员工对雇主待遇的感知相关。
Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the “rational cheater model” by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the “rational cheater model” predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.