Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
构建模型发现，价值最大化的公司治理下，过度自信经理人比理性经理人更可能被提拔为CEO；过度自信CEO对企业价值的影响呈非单调关系，且不同于低风险厌恶的影响。
ABSTRACT We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value‐destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value‐maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk‐averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes‐Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.