The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
提出一种价格理论方法，将发送者的说服问题类比为寻找说服经济的瓦尔拉斯均衡，利用福利定理检验说服方案的最优性并刻画支持最优解的价格结构。
We propose a price-theoretic approach to Bayesian persuasion by establishing an analogy between the sender’s problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy. The sender, who acts as a consumer, purchases posterior beliefs at their prices using the prior distribution as her endowment. A single firm has the technology to garble the state. Welfare theorems provide a verification tool for optimality of a persuasion scheme and characterize the structure of prices that support the optimal solution. This approach yields a tractable solution method for persuasion problems in which the sender’s utility depends only on the expected state.