Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Debt
研究了风险规避的CEO在高杠杆或高违约概率公司中如何降低企业风险，即使存在强风险承担激励时也如此，对理解债务治理与高管行为有用。
Abstract We investigate the risk choices of risk-averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives, unobserved firm and market effects, and debt governance. The impact of CEO risk aversion is economically significant.