CEO Investment Cycles
研究发现CEO任期内存在投资周期：早期减少投资、后期增加投资，导致企业资产和就业呈周期性增长，且该效应与商业周期或融资约束的影响相当，主要源于代理问题。
This paper documents the existence of a CEO investment cycle, in which disinvestment decreases over a CEO's tenure, while investment increases, leading to “cyclical” firm growth in assets and employment. The estimated variation in investment rate over the CEO investment cycle is of the same order of magnitude as the differences caused by business cycles or financial constraints. Results from a number of tests generally support the view that the investment cycle is caused by agency problems, leading to increasing investment quantity and decreasing investment quality over time as the CEO gains more control over his board. Received February 17, 2015; accepted October 1, 2015 by Editor David Denis.