The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt
构建了一个上市公司的动态代理模型，研究经理人风险规避如何导致投资不足、平滑租金和支付，以及不完全利用利息税盾，并分析了不同偏好下投资、债务和支付决策的互动关系。
We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt, and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers’ preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt, and payout proportional to the firm’s net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows, and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking-order model.