Memory and Anticipation
在经济学决策模型中引入记忆不完美，从而为预期情绪提供自然角色，并展示其显著的行为含义，包括理性选择看似劣势策略及对提醒行为的理论解释。
The introduction of memory imperfections into models of economic decision making creates a natural role for anticipatory emotions. Their combination has striking behavioural implications. The paper first shows that agents can rationally select apparently dominated strategies. We consider Newcomb's Paradox and the Prisoners' Dilemma. We provide a resolution for Newcomb's Paradox and argue it requires the decision maker to ascribe only a tiny weight to anticipatory emotions. For some ranges of parameters, it is possible to obtain cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma with probability arbitrarily close to unity. The second half of the paper provides a theory of reminders. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.