Inefficiencies in Networked Markets
研究了网络化市场中关系专用性投资导致的低效率，通过分解市场结构揭示交易机会如何影响交易对象和价格，并分析了高技能劳动力、并购和天然气三个市场中的应用。
In many markets, relationship specific investments are necessary for trade. These formed relationships constitute a networked market in which not all buyers can trade with all sellers. We show that networked markets can be decomposed to identify how alternative trading opportunities affect who trades with whom and at what price. This uncovers agents' incentives to invest in relationships. Investment inefficiencies can eliminate all the gains from trade, but for reasons that differ depending on how investments are made. Three applications are considered in detail: high-skill labor markets, merger markets when industries are consolidating, and the international market for natural gas.