The Effect of Bank Supervision and Examination on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
利用银行监管检查减少的外生变化，发现监管放松导致银行风险承担增加，表现为高风险贷款、资产快速增长和低质量资本依赖，并提高了倒闭概率和处置成本。
Abstract We exploit an exogenous reduction in bank supervision and examination to demonstrate a causal effect of supervisory oversight on financial institutions’ risk taking. The additional risk took the form of risky lending, faster asset growth, and a greater reliance on low-quality capital. This response to less oversight boosted banks’ odds of failure. Lastly, we show that the reduction in oversight capacity led to more costly failures because there were longer delays in closing insolvent institutions, and because more bad assets were passed to the government insurance fund.