Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
提出NLK模型，允许玩家认为对手可能不如自己或与自己同样理性，并用五个已发表实验的数据检验，发现简单版NLK在多数情况下比纳什均衡和Level-K更好地解释数据。
Abstract We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and level-k. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions from those of the NE and level-k; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or fewer parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.