MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE USE OF FOREIGN‐EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES BY BANKS
研究了美国银行控股公司管理层薪酬和持股对外汇衍生品使用的影响，发现期权奖励与衍生品使用负相关，管理层持股正相关，大机构股东持股激励管理层对冲。
Abstract We examine the effect of managerial compensation and ownership on the use of foreign‐exchange derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies. We focus on derivatives used for purposes other than trading to investigate derivative use in a hedging framework. We use instrumental variables probit and sample‐selection models to estimate the effects of endogenous and exogenous factors on the probability and extent of foreign‐exchange derivatives used. We find that the use of derivatives is inversely related to option awards but positively related to managerial ownership. Finally, our results suggest that ownership by large institutional shareholders provides incentive for managers to hedge.