Symmetry in Pay for Luck
基于200多种模型设定，发现CEO的薪酬对好运气和坏运气的反应是对称的，推翻了文献中广泛接受的运气薪酬不对称观点，这对理解高管薪酬中的租金攫取问题有重要影响。
Abstract In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.