The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina
本文提出一种交易理论，分析政治制度如何影响政治家之间的跨期交易，进而影响政策质量，并以阿根廷为例说明其政治制度运作导致低质量政策。
Public policies are the outcomes of complex intertemporal exchanges among politicians. The political institutions of a country constitute the framework within which these transactions are accomplished. We develop a transactions theory to understand the ways in which political institutions affect the transactions that political actors are able to undertake, and hence the quality of the policies that emerge. We argue that Argentina is a case in which the functioning of political institutions has inhibited the capacity to undertake efficient intertemporal political exchanges. We use positive political theory and transaction cost economics to explain the workings of Argentine political institutions and to show how their operation gives rise to low-quality policies.