Litigation Costs and Returns to Experience
建立模型分析不当解雇诉讼中赔偿上限如何影响工人起诉倾向和经验回报，利用EEOC和CPS数据考察1991年民权法案通过后受保护工人经验回报的变化，发现雇主应对就业保护可能产生再分配效应。
We develop a model linking maximum damage awards available to plaintiffs in wrongful termination lawsuits, workers' propensity to sue as a function of experience, and returns to experience. Using Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data on protected-worker discrimination complaints and labor-market data from the Current Population Survey, we examine how returns to experience among protected workers changed around the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We show that employers' reactions to employment protections may induce redistributive effects. Furthermore, these effects operate not merely across groups of differing protected status, but also within groups of identical protected status.