Dumping And Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost‐Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information*
论证反倾销保护与自愿出口限制（VER）的兴起密切相关，指出在国内政府对外国企业成本信息不完全时，基于成本定义的倾销会导致高效外国企业主动限制出口，进而扭曲政府认知并导致过高关税。
We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints (VERs) are fundamentally interrelated. We show that both can be explained by a cost‐based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs. Given that its costs are only imperfectly observed and knowing the government's incentives to protect, efficient foreign firms will voluntarily restrain their exports prior to the antidumping investigation. In turn, the VER distorts the government's perception of the foreign firm's efficiency and leads to undesirably high duties regardless of the foreign firm's efficiency.