The Choice of Corporate Liquidity and Corporate Governance
研究公司治理如何影响企业在现金和信用额度之间的选择，发现收购威胁减弱时企业会增加现金持有，而内部治理好的企业这一倾向较弱。
In this paper, I study how corporate governance influences firms' choices between cash and lines of credit. Stakeholders may disagree about firms' liquidity choices because they differ in the allocation of ex-post control rights for the firms' liquidity reserves. Using state-level changes in takeover protection as exogenous shocks to corporate governance, I find that firms increase cash relative to lines of credit when the threat of takeover weakens. Consistent with the theory, this tendency is weaker for firms with good internal governance. Overall, my findings suggest the choice of corporate liquidity is a channel through which corporate governance works. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.