Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
构建了一个理论模型，分析个体利他主义与贪婪的异质性如何与社会声誉或自尊相互作用，解释外部激励为何可能部分甚至完全挤出亲社会行为，并探讨最优激励水平及赞助商竞争对社会福利的影响。
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.