Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence
利用罗素指数调整带来的外生冲击，发现机构所有权增加会显著提升企业避税程度，避税手段包括使用税收庇护，并带来利润率提高和更易达到分析师预期等短期好处。
ABSTRACT We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, and a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively, the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.