股东投票与公司治理

Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance

Annual Review of Financial Economics · 2010
被引 248
ABS 3

中文导读

本文综述了公司投票与选举的最新研究,探讨股东如何利用投票权影响董事会选举和高管薪酬,以及空投票等创新策略如何改变公司治理。

Abstract

This article reviews recent research into corporate voting and elections. Regulatory reforms have given shareholders more voting power in the election of directors and in executive compensation issues. Shareholders use voting as a channel of communication with boards of directors, and protest voting can lead to significant changes in corporate governance and strategy. Some investors have embraced innovative empty voting strategies for decoupling voting rights from cash flow rights, enabling them to mount aggressive programs of shareholder activism. Market-based methods have been used by researchers to establish the value of voting rights and show how this value can vary in different settings.

公司治理股东投票股东积极主义投票权价值