When They're Sixty-Four: Peer Effects and the Timing of Retirement
利用洛杉矶教师行政数据和两次意外养老金改革，研究发现同事退休会使教师本人退休概率提高1.5-2个百分点，并探讨了作用机制。
This paper examines the effect of peers on an individual's likelihood of retirement using an administrative dataset of all retirement-eligible Los Angeles teachers for the years 1998–2001. We use two large unexpected pension reforms that differentially impacted financial incentives within and across schools to construct an instrument for others' retirement decisions. Controlling for individual and school characteristics, we find that the retirement of an additional teacher in the previous year at the same school increases a teacher's own likelihood of retirement by 1.5–2 percentage points. We then explore some possible mechanisms through which this effect operates.