反垄断执法的理由

The Case for Antitrust Enforcement

Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2003
被引 246
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

通过案例和实证证据,论证反垄断执法对消费者和社会福利的必要性与成功,指出其收益远超执法和合规成本。

Abstract

This paper provides evidence of the necessity and success of antitrust enforcement. It begins with examples of socially beneficial antitrust challenges by the federal antitrust agencies to price-fixing and other forms of collusion; to mergers that appear likely to harm competition; and to monopolists that use anticompetitive exclusionary practices to obtain or maintain their market power. It then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S. firms during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the behavior of firms across different national antitrust regimes. Overall, it concludes, the benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social welfare -- particularly in deterring the harms from anticompetitive conduct across the economy -- appear to be far larger than what the government spends on antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.

反垄断执法价格合谋并购审查市场支配地位滥用