Takeovers and Divergence of Investor Opinion
研究了收购溢价与投资者对目标公司股权价值意见分歧的关系，发现意见分歧越大，收购溢价、股价提前上涨和公告后上涨越高，但公司被收购的可能性降低。
We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the pre-announcement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.