Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox
研究发现公司战略独特性会因增加分析师信息收集成本而遭资本市场折价，但独特性又是创造经济租的必要条件，形成悖论。
In this paper, we argue that managers confront a paradox in selecting strategy. On one hand, capital markets systematically discount uniqueness in the strategy choices of firms. Uniqueness in strategy heightens the cost of collecting and analyzing information to evaluate a firm's future value. These greater costs in strategy evaluation discourage the collection and analysis of information regarding the firm, and result in a valuation discount. On the other hand, uniqueness in strategy is a necessary condition for creating economic rents and should, except for this information cost, be positively associated with firm value. We find empirical support for both propositions using a novel measure of strategy uniqueness in a firm panel data set between 1985 and 2007. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.