Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good
研究一个委托人决定是否生产一种不可分割的商品及其特征，代理人沿垂直和水平两个维度分化，在私人信息下，委托人会偏向低估值或高负效用的代理人。
In this model, a principal decides whether to produce one indivisible good and which characteristics it contains. Agents are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical parameter that captures their valuation for the good, and a horizontal parameter that captures their disutility when the characteristics are distant from their preferred ones. When valuations are private information, the principal produces a good with characteristics more on the lines of the preferences of the agent with the lowest valuation. Under asymmetric information on the horizontal dimension, the principal biases the decision in favor of the agent who incurs the highest disutility. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.