Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers
研究了销售经理作为公司代理人，如何出于自身配额激励而操纵下属的留任与配额调整，发现13%-15%的调整和留任可归因于经理的个人利益。
This paper examines how sales managers, acting as agents of the firm, game the staffing and incentives of their subordinates. Sales managers on a quota's cusp have a unique personal incentive to retain and lower quotas for poor-performing subordinates, allowing one to isolate a manager's interest from the firm's. Using microdata from 244 firms that subscribe to a cloud-based service for processing sales compensation, I estimate that 13%-15% of both quota adjustments and retentions among poor performers are explained by managers' incentives around quotas. Although a minority of poor performers are subsequently terminated or transferred, most are retained indefinitely.