CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*
通过实验检验相关均衡的实证有效性，发现被试在“斗鸡”博弈中遵循私人第三方建议的条件是：建议来自相关均衡且该均衡相比纳什均衡能提高收益。
We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium , an important generalization of Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third‐party recommendations drawn from publicly announced distributions. We find that when recommendations are given, behavior differs from both a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium and behavior without recommendations. In particular, subjects typically follow recommendations if and only if (1) those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium and (2) that correlated equilibrium is payoff‐enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.