Bundling and quality assurance
研究了在不完美私人监督下，销售两种体验品的企业通过捆绑销售能同时提高生产者剩余和消费者剩余，因为捆绑迫使消费者同时购买两种产品，从而获得更充分信息并采取更严厉的惩罚策略，克服了搭便车问题。
Abstract With imperfect private monitoring, a firm selling two experience goods can increase both producer and consumer surplus by bundling. Bundling constrains consumers to buy two products, making consumers better informed and ensuring that they use tougher punishment strategies. Both increased monitoring and increased punishment benefit other consumers, so bundling overcomes a free‐rider problem. The social value of bundling is even larger if consumers cannot attribute a negative signal to the specific product that generated it, or if one of the two goods is a durable and the other is a complementary nondurable. Our results are robust to mixed bundling.