Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk
研究了退出风险在动态信号传递中的作用：卖方私知商品质量并决定交易时机，低质量卖方为避免延迟成本而主动与早期退出者混同，导致预期质量随时间上升，并刻画了均衡交易动态。
We study the role of dropout risk in dynamic signaling. A seller privately knows the quality of an indivisible good and decides when to trade. In each period, he may draw a dropout shock that forces him to trade immediately. To avoid costly delay, the seller with a low-quality good voluntarily pools with early dropouts, implying that the expected quality of the good increases over time. We characterize the time-varying equilibrium trading dynamics. It is demonstrated that the maximum equilibrium delay of trade is decreasing in the initial belief that the good is of high quality.