Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
研究了易匹配和难匹配两类代理人的动态交换市场，证明贪婪策略在大型市场中优于其他策略，能实现更多匹配和更短等待时间，并在国家肾脏登记数据中得到验证。
Abstract We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents provide by facilitating future matchings. We prove that the trade-off between a “thicker” market and faster matching vanishes in large markets; the greedy policy leads to shorter waiting times and more agents matched than any other policy. We empirically confirm these findings in data from the National Kidney Registry. Greedy matching achieves as many transplants as commonly used policies (1.8$\%$ more than monthly batching) and shorter waiting times (16 days faster than monthly batching).