What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods
通过在希腊雅典的出租车实地实验，测量了乘客信息差异对司机欺诈行为的影响，发现乘客对最优路线不了解时会被绕远路，对本地计费系统不了解时被篡改账单的概率增加约15个百分点。
Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behaviour by sellers. This article presents a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on significantly longer detours, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage points. Passengers' perceived income seems to have no effect on fraud. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.