税收与股利政策:代理问题和股东冲突的弱化效应

Taxation and Dividend Policy: The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts

Review of Financial Studies · 2017
被引 81
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

利用所有权结构和投资者税收状况的专有数据,研究股利税如何影响公司派息,发现代理问题和股东冲突会显著削弱税收对派息的影响。

Abstract

Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners’ tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially.Received June 20, 2016; editorial decision January 24, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

股利税收所有权结构代理问题股东冲突股利政策