Oligopolistic Competition and Search Without Priors
研究了消费者在不知道价格分布的情况下进行搜索的寡头竞争模型，发现消费者行为满足一致性要求时信念最大化香农熵，且预期价格随企业数量增加而下降，消费者可能因信息不足而获益。
In this article, I examine a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search for prices but have no knowledge of the underlying price distribution. The consumers' behaviour satisfies four consistency requirements and, as a result, their beliefs about the underlying distribution maximise Shannon entropy. I derive the optimal stopping rule and equilibrium price distribution of the model. Unlike in Stahl (1989), the expected price is decreasing in the number of firms. Moreover, consumers can benefit from being uninformed, if the number of firms is sufficiently large.