Insider trading as a vehicle to appropriate rent from R&D
研究了内幕交易如何被用来侵占研发成果的租金，发现研发密集型公司的内幕买入会引发更大的股价正面反应，投资者认为经理人借此获利。
Abstract While most insider trading is routine and legal, investors still treat it as new information about the firm's prospects—they assume that trades reflect managers' attempts to profit from their private information. This article explores insider trading as a mechanism to appropriate rent from R&D advances. We analyze stock price reactions to over 134,000 insider‐trading events and find that insider purchases generate larger positive stock price reactions for R&D‐intensive firms. Investors seem to assume that managers use insider trading to appropriate rent from R&D breakthroughs. We discuss how shareholders may prefer this rent appropriation mechanism over other forms of compensation that directly reduce the firm's income. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.