Distracted Institutional Investors
利用详细交易数据，发现专业基金经理在持仓股票集中发布财报时会减少对其他股票的交易，这种分心效应在主动选股经理中更明显，并通过降低交易盈利、增加成本和不愿止损三个渠道损害业绩。
I investigate how distraction affects the trading behavior of professional asset managers. Exploring detailed transaction-level data, I show that managers with a large fraction of portfolio stocks that have an earnings announcement are significantly less likely to trade in other stocks, suggesting that these announcements divert attention from trading decisions for other stocks. This distraction effect is more pronounced for nonpassive managers who engage in active stock selection choices. Finally, I identify three channels through which distraction hurts managers’ performance: Distracted managers trade less profitably, incur slightly higher transaction costs, and are less likely to close losing positions.