The Effect of State Income Tax Apportionment and Tax Incentives on New Capital Expenditures
研究美国各州公司所得税制度差异如何影响企业新资本投资，发现财产所得税负增加会减少制造业资本支出，而投资税收激励有正向但递减的效果。
This study examines how variations in states' corporate income tax regimes affect new capital investment by business. Using U.S. state-aggregated data from 1983 to 1996, we find in pooled and fixed-effects regressions that new capital expenditures by corporations in the manufacturing sector are decreasing in the income tax burden on property (measured as the product of the statutory tax rate and the property factor weight), and increasing at a decreasing rate in investment-related tax incentives. The effect of the income tax burden on property is more pronounced for states mandating unitary taxation or the throwback rule. Triangulating our empirical findings with prior analytical and simulation studies suggests the following hierarchy for the relative importance of major attributes of state corporate income tax regimes: the unitary or throwback requirement is most influential on incremental capital investment, followed by apportionment weights and tax rates, and, finally, investment-related incentives.