Competing on Speed
研究了资产市场中交易速度与市场碎片化的关系，发现交易场所通过技术投资竞争，速度快的场所收费更高并吸引对速度敏感的投资者，竞争提高了效率但可能导致过度碎片化和速度无效率。
We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative e ffi ciency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically ine ffi cient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.