The Limits of Financial Globalization
指出，尽管过去60年国际投资壁垒大幅降低，但金融全球化的实际影响有限，原因在于主权国家统治者和公司内部人各自谋私利导致的“双重代理问题”，这迫使内部人集中持股，从而限制了经济增长和金融发展。
ABSTRACT Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision‐making because of “twin agency problems” that arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and corporate insiders must co‐invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization.