Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions
研究收购方管理者在换股并购前后的机会主义报告行为，发现盈余膨胀程度高的公司倾向于周五发布并购公告，且公告前多个季度就开始操纵盈余，周五公告者的异常应计与后续市场表现负相关更强。
Abstract We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock‐for‐stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre‐merger announcement abnormal accruals and post‐merger announcement market performance than non‐Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.