An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"*
用经济学模型分析“装白人”现象，即少数族裔成员因担心被同伴排斥而不敢表现得太优秀，结果导致中等能力者选择相同的教育水平，而低能力和高能力者则通过教育投资显示自身类型。
This paper formalizes a widely discussed peer eect entitled 'acting white'. 'Acting White'is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection. Without peer eects, equilibria involve all ability types choosing dierent levels of education. 'Acting White'alters the equilibrium dramatically: the (possibly empty) set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education; ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level. Only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group. The model's predictions …t many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members.