The Use of Debt Covenants Worldwide: Institutional Determinants and Implications on Financial Reporting
研究了36个国家银团贷款中债务契约的使用如何随法律制度变化，发现执法力度强和债权人权利弱的国家更常用契约，且契约使用与及时损失确认正相关，债权人权利会削弱这一关系。
Abstract This study investigates how the use of debt covenants around the world varies with legal institutions. On the basis of syndicated loans in 36 countries, we find that debt covenants are more prevalent in countries with stronger law enforcement and weaker creditor rights, suggesting that law enforcement facilitates, and creditor rights substitute for, the use of covenants. We also find that the substitution effect between covenant use and creditor rights exists mainly in countries with strong law enforcement, and the effect of legal institutions on covenants is primarily driven by covenants that preserve seniority and capital. In addition, timely loss recognition increases with the use of debt covenants and strong creditor rights attenuate this relation. Overall, our study is the first to provide comprehensive evidence on how the use of debt covenants responds to legal institutions and how it bridges the previously documented link between legal institutions and accounting conservatism.