VC Funds: Aging Brings Myopia
研究风险投资基金中有限合伙人与普通合伙人之间的利益冲突，发现基金有限存续期和普通合伙人的信息优势会导致其继续坏项目或放弃好项目，提供实证预测和证据。
Abstract We study the conflict of interests between the limited partners (LPs) and the general partner (GP) in a venture capital (VC) fund with a limited life span. LPs commit money, while the GP selects and monitors projects. Midway into the project, the GP privately observes the project’s quality and the estimated time to exit. The fund’s limited time horizon and the GP’s informational advantage lead to inefficient decisions at this stage. First, the GP continues bad projects. Second, he may stop monitoring good, but delay-prone projects. We provide empirical predictions and illustrative evidence that the magnitude of the effect is significant.