Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas
研究当新创意驱动经济增长、成功创新的回报是顶层收入、且创新无法通过研究补贴完美瞄准时，顶层收入税会减缓新创意的产生，从而降低所有人的收入，这限制了最优顶层税率。
This paper considers top income taxation when (i) new ideas drive economic growth, (ii) the reward for successful innovation is a top income, and (iii) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a research subsidy—think about the business methods of Walmart, the creation of Uber, or the “idea” of Amazon. These conditions lead to a new force affecting the optimal top tax rate: by slowing the creation of new ideas that drive aggregate GDP, top income taxation reduces everyone’s income, not just income at the top. This force sharply constrains both revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing top tax rates.