Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder Rights
探究企业价值与基于股东权利的治理指数G之间的关系，发现因果关系是从G到企业价值，而非相反，表明赋予股东更多权利可降低代理成本、提升企业价值。
I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value.