Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry
利用美国Hatch-Waxman法案的独家营销权条款，研究潜在竞争如何影响仿制药定价，发现小市场降价可有效阻止进入，而大市场则容纳进入。
We use the unique regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical industry to examine how potential competition affects generic drug pricing. Our identification strategy exploits a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act that awards 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first valid generic drug applicant against the holder of a branded drug patent. In smaller drug markets, we find that price falls in response to an increase in potential competition. We also find that few manufacturers enter these markets, indicating this price reduction is an effective deterrent. In contrast, we find that generic incumbents accommodate entry in larger drug markets. © No rights reserved. This work was authored as part of the Contributor's official duties as an Employee of the United States Government and is therefore a work of the United States Government. In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 105, no copyright protection is available for such works under U.S. law.