The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves
研究了央行在准备金付息环境下，如何同时运用利率和数量工具来管理通胀与产出权衡，并抑制金融中介过度发行短期债务造成的外部性。
In a world with interest on reserves, the central bank has two distinct tools that it can use to raise the short-term policy rate: it can either increase the interest it pays on reserve balances, or it can reduce the quantity of reserves in the system. We argue that by using both of these tools together, and by broadening the scope of reserve requirements, the central bank can simultaneously pursue two objectives: it can manage the inflation-output tradeoff using a Taylor-type rule, and it can regulate the externalities created by socially excessive short-term debt issuance on the part of financial intermediaries.