Deal Initiation in Mergers and Acquisitions
研究了目标公司发起并购交易的现象，发现目标公司经济疲软、财务约束和负面经济冲击是主要动机，且目标发起的交易溢价、公告期异常回报和估值倍数显著更低，这主要源于目标管理层的私有信息。
We investigate the effects of target initiation in M&As. We find target-initiated deals are common and that important motives for these deals are target economic weakness, financial constraints, and negative economy-wide shocks. We determine that average takeover premia, target abnormal returns around merger announcements, and deal value to EBITDA multiples are significantly lower in target-initiated deals. This gap is not explained by weak target financial conditions. Adjusting for self-selection, we conclude that target managers’ private information is a major driver of lower premia in target-initiated deals. This gap widens as information asymmetry between merger partners rises.